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SAFETY AND MISSION ASSURANCE 
STS-119 SARR 
Certificate of Flight Readiness (CoFR) 
Items Reviewed: 
1.Hazard Analysis for Ground Systems 
2.FMEAlCIL 
3.Hardware/Software Design Certification 
4.0ther Risk Analysis (GORA,PFMEA) 
5.Audits 
6.lnterface Control Documents 
7.0MRSDs for Ground Systems 
8.Launch Commit Criteria 
9.1ntegrated Vehicle Readiness 
10.PRACA 
11.Waivers, Variances, Deviations, Exceptions 
12.Material Review Board 
13.Alert Notification 
14.Mission Support Training 
1S.Critical Process Changes 
16.Contingency Planning 
Shuttle Items S&MA Reviewed: 
STS-126 DFRC LandinglTurnaround Issue 
STS-126 OAA White Room Door Anomaly 
STS-124 TIR Logs Sheets 
LC-39A Flame Trench Readiness 
Post Flight Tile Inspection 
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ISS/Payload Items Reviewed: 
Integrated Cargo Hazard Analysis 
Ground Safety Reviews 
Quality Assurance Surveillance 
Independent Mission Assessment 
Residual Risks 
Institutional S&MA Items Reviewed: 
Construction/Safety Activities at Launch 
Critical Facilities 
Engineering Assurance 
Quality Assurance 
S&MA Integration Office Items Reviewed: 
Range Safety 
KSC S&MA performed an internal review on 01/09/2009 and identified no constraints 
against this milestone, and will continue to track the satisfactory completion of open 
work. 
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Critical Items List 
(Cll) 
HW S/w Design 
Certification 
Risk, Probabilistic 
Reliability, 
Maintainability and 
Supportability 
Analysis 
Audits I 
Surveillance 
Findings 
Interface Control 
Documents (lCD's) 
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Hazard analysis and reports have been 
verified to have valid hazard causes, 
controls, and verification. 
Critical item lists (Cll's) have been 
verified to have valid criticality, effects & 
operational controls. 
Certification of hardware requirements 
have been verified and documented. 
Any flight specific risk, probability, 
reliability, maintainability, and 
supportability analysis findings impacting 
safety or mission success have been 
resolved. 
Any flight specific audit or surveillance 
findings impacting safety and mission 
success have been resolved. 
lCD's have been verified to not invalidate 
certification, hazard controls, or Cil 
rationale. 
None 
None 
None 
Non-Compliance to NSTS 60538: 
Exception submitted by SSP Quality 
Manager. KSC S&MA IAT assessing 
current GMIP Sampling Program. 
Recommendation: Not a constraint 
None 
Y - Non-standard open work or exception 
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Shuttle Processing CoFR Matrix 
NSTS 08171 Operations and 
Maintenance Requirements and not invalidate hazard and Cil controls. 
Specifications Document (OMRSD) 
launch Commit Criteria (lCC) 
Problem Reporting and Corrective 
Action (PRACA) Reportable Items 
(HW & SIW) 
Waivers and Deviations (level 
II/level III) 
lCC changes have been verified not to 
invalidate hazard controls or Cil 
retention rationale. 
HW & SIW program problem reporting 
and corrective action reportable items 
applicable to this mission have been 
disposition. 
Waivers, exceptions and deviations, 
have been verified to be acceptable for 
flight and any violation of any existing 
certification, hazard, and Cil rationale is 
documented. 
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None 
None 
Pressure Vessels Waiver: 
Waiver is needed due to 
requirements clarification 
from HQ 
Recommendation: Not a 
constraint 
6 (+2 Possible) Open gPRD 
Waivers: 
Recommendation: Not a 
constraint 
I pag~ 
Y - Non-standard open work or exception 
.-------- ----------- - ------------------- --------------- - ----
Alerts 
Mission Support 
Integrated Vehicle 
Readiness 
Critical Process 
Changes 
Contingency 
Planning 
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5huttle Processing CoFR Matrix 
MRB items requiring NASA S&MA disposition have been 
approved. 
Alert notices have been assessed for applicability to this 
mission and have been disposition. 
Date 
Jan-26-2009 
Open GIDEP Alerts: 
Continuously reviewed 
Recommendation: Not 
a Constraint 
S&MA personnel supporting L&L, flight support, Mishap None 
Investigation Team, and Mishap Rapid Response Team 
have been identified, trained, and qualified to support. 
Verify Integrated Vehicle Readiness has been assessed None 
through performance of GMIPS, and surveillance and any 
discrepancies identified have been satisfactorily 
dispositioned. 
Verify critical process changes have been assessed and are None 
no safety impact to ground processing or mission success. 
Verify Contingency Plans are current and in place for None 
Launch and Landing. 
Y - Non-standard open work or exception 
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SAFETY AND MISSION ASSURANCE 
STS-119 SARR 
Readiness Statement 
--------------------------------------~ 
Presenter 
Christopher Knear 
Date I page
6 Jan-26-2009 
Readiness Statement - "KSC Safety and Mission Assurance is ready to support 
the STS-119 Launch and Landing." 
~~C> 
Mark Wiese 
Chief, KSC S&MA Launch Vehicle Chief, KSC Institutional S&MA Division 
Processing Division 
~:L£L I-oIG Maynette Smit 
Chief, KSC S&MA ISS & Spacecraft 
Processing Division 
--------------------------------------------------~ 
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11) Waivers, Variances, Deviations, and 
Exceptions QPRD Waivers 
Presenter 
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Government Mandatory Inspection Point (GMIP) = NASA QAS buy point 
Designated Inspection Point (DIP) = Contractor Quality buy point 
SRS 
Facility DIP Crane Operations Work order (WO) di d not o co to use . 
FAC-08-001 include DIP on installation Successful proof load tests 
steps for brakes 0 n V AS have verifi ed brake 
#2325 ton crane . WO function . 
has been d . 
GSE GMIP & DIP HMF Hypergolic ~ did not include to use 
GSE-08-001 Systems GMIP & DIP on OMRSD throat plugs . ORMSD 
inspection steps for GSE requirements have been 
throat plugs . Q..M1:..s have satisfied . Inspection 
been updated . attri butes detectable by 
trained technician . Plugs 
not in use have been re-
ins ected . 
GSE DIP Propella nt Systems Job pia n di d not i ncl ude o co ruse 
GSE-08-002 DIP on inspection steps of carrier plates . Current use 
carrier plates . Job plans will be after inspections 
have been updated . Work duri ng S0024 . 
wi II be performed with 
Quality duri ng S0024 for 
GSE DIP Vehicle Physical Job plan did not include con ruse . 
GSE-08-003 Interface Systems DIP 0 n OM RSD test & ORMSD requirements have 
inspection steps of been satisfied . Test & 
QD/filter assemblies . Job inspection attributed are 
plans have been updated. detectable by trai ned 
technician. 
GSE 
GSE-08-005 
GSE 
GSE-XX-XXX 
GSE 
GSE-XX-XXX 
11) Waivers, Variances, Deviations, and 
Exceptions QPRD Waivers (Cont'd) 
Mobile Support Job pia n di d not i ncl ude 
Equipment DIP on OMRSD filter 
inspection steps. Job 
plans have been updated. 
DIP CrawlerfT ra nsporter Job pia n di d not i ncl ude 
DIP on assembly & 
inspection steps . 
GMIP/DIP L02/LH2 Carrier Work performed without 
Plates Quality support. 
GMIP MLP LH2 Transfer Work perfo rmed without 
Line Quality support. 
NO ISSUES I CONCERNS 
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o co ruse . 
ORMSD requirements have 
been satisfied . Test & 
inspection attributed are 
detectable by trai ned 
tech ni ci an . 
No constraint for crawler 
use. Requirements are 
being evaluated for 
possibility of lowering 
criticality . Technicians have 
extensi ve engine 
maintenance traini 
In work to determine quality 
coverage requi red, and 
rework ve rses waiver 
KSC Safety Variance: 
Pressure Vessels I Systems (PV/S) 
----------------------------------------~ 
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• Abbreviated integrity assessment required by recent release of 
NASA-STD-8719.17 and KNPR 8715.3 Rev G 
• Adequate resources have not been allocated to KSC to comply with new requirements in 
time for launch 
• If wavier is not approved, all systems will have to be removed from service until 
completion of certification/recertification. 
• Rationale for waiver 
• Existing PV/S certifications per KNPR 8715.3 Rev C-1 are adequate to insure current 
operational capability 
• All in-service inspections and regular preventative maintenance are current for KSC PV/S 
• PV/S have not changed, only the requirements for recertification 
• Likelihood of a system failing is minimized by ASME design criteria, in-service 
inspections, safety walk downs, and normal periodic preventative maintenance. 
• SA-B recommends proceeding with processing waiver and 
approving as soon as reasonably possible. 
KSC SAFETY AND MISSION ASSURANCE DIRECTORATE 
Launch Vehicle Processing Division 
NASA Kennedy Space Center, Florida • 
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STS-126 OAA White Room Anomaly 
RISK TYPE: 
HAZARD REPORTS: 
CRITICALITY: 
ORGANIZATION: 
ASSIGNED TO: 
Mission Assurance, Safety 
NIA 
NIA 
KSC S&MA 
Malcolm Glenn I KSC I SA-B 
RISK DESCRIPTION I STATEMENT: 
- Orbiter Access Arm (OAA) White Room dock seal carrier door not secured in full open 
position for launch 
- Potential debris strike to vehicle 
- Potential damage to facility/GSE 
BACKGROUND 
- NASA QC noted suspect liE hatch tile damage once door was opened and further 
inspection was performed 
- Caused an interruption to closeout procedures 
- Dock seal carrier door securing procedure overlooked 
RATIONALE & RECOMMENDATION 
- Launch Director (LD) formed Resolution Team - Corrective Actions implemented 
Date 01/26/09 
- Rewrote Launch Countdown steps for White Room closeout to follow more logical flow, including more NASA QC buys 
- Added step to perform final White Room configuration inspection, including Closeout (Cia) Crew lead notification to NTD 
- Improved coordination between cia Crew and NASA QC for tracking steps, including use of laminated checklist 
- SA-B Assessment 
- SA-B Human Factors performed initial assessment of White Room cia and concurs with corrective actions 
- SA-B participated in LD Resolution Team 
NOT A CONSTRAINT TO STS-119 
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RISK TYPE: Safety 
HAZARD REPORTS: N/A 
CRITICALITY: N/A 
ORGANIZATION: KSC S&MA 
ASSIGNED TO: Doug Folkes / KSC / SA-B 1 
RISK DESCRIPTION I STATEMENT: 
• The liberation of Flame Trench Wall refractory material at T-O causes damage to KSC ground facility. 
BACKGROUND 
Date 09/17/08 
L 
I Probable 
K 
E Infrequent 
L 
I 
H Remote 
0 
0 Improbable 
0 
• 
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X 
Marg 
• During Launch of STS-124 from Pad A, approximately 3500 bricks from the SRB Flame Trench east wall were liberated. Follow on 
investigation had determined brick-to-wall anchoring system/bonding degradation was one of the main contributors to failure . Loss of 
bricks from the Flame Trench sidewalls was unprecedented and unexpected. Corrective action was to inspect/evaluate and repair the 
East and West SRB Flame Trench walls. Fondu Fyre Panel design option was used for repair. 
RATIONALE I RECOMMENDATION 
• There has been no previous loss of material to this extent. The configuration of the pad, water flow and exhaust direction and location of 
the MLP between the Flame Trench and flight hardware protects the shuttle from debris exposure. 
• Damage to the north bridge crossover from Flame Trench debris was evaluated and determined to be a highly unlikely event with a worst 
case consequence being minor damage to the KSC ground facility. 
• Implementation of the design modifications and repairs have reduced the likelihood of damage from possible (Infrequent) to (Improbable) 
with a Severity of (Marginal). 
• A repeat occurrence of the post STS-124 Pad A Flame Trench Damage is Unlikely_ 
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• STS-127/400 will be the Launch On Need vehicle for STS-119 
• 14 April - OV-105 rollover to VAB 
• 21 April - STS-400 rollout to Pad 
• 13 May - STS-400 launch date 
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• KSC verified that STS-400 could support a 13 May launch date based on an 
early 90 day CSCS capability estimate, 
• Some flexibility to launch earlier exists if CSCS changes 
